Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the inquiry into the war that the legality of the conflict was not challenged within the security council and has not been since in the international court of justice.
But, appearing before Sir John Chilcot's inquiry in central London, he admitted there was a 'failure to establish legitimacy' within individual member states.
The US and Britain faced allegations of launching a legal war after they failed to win crucial French and Russian backing for a UN resolution that would have directly authorised military action.
However, Washington and London fell back on the existing resolution 1441, which they just justified an invasion.
While the French and Russians were 'absolutely determined' to establish the need for a precise decision on the use of force in the resolution, the Americans were 'absolutely determined' to resist this, Sir Jeremy said.
'Those two positions were totally irreconcilable. Then you have a situation where diplomacy got clever.'
He explained that resolution 1441 was 'equivocal' on what would happen in the event of non-compliance. It stated the security council would meet, but did not state they would make any decisions about what to do in this event.
'The US and UK took the terms of 1441 absolutely literally, which is the fair and just thing to do with a resolution that takes on the force of a legal declaration,' Sir Jeremy added.
He said the French and others interpreted the resolution as meaning that in the event of non-compliance it would be the security council which would decide what action to take next.
'We never were active enough after the adoption of 1441 to try and clear up that ambiguity because we thought we'd won the point,' Sir Jeremy explained.
He added that at no point had any member of the security council ever presented evidence to him proving that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction.
The allegation that the White House and Downing St always knew Saddam had no nuclear weapon capabilities or programmes formed the central part of Sir Jeremy's memoirs that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office asked be withdrawn in 2005.
Yesterday the inquiry heard from the UK ambassador to Washington at the time of the Iraq war that the coalition search for a 'smoking gun' had failed.
Sir Christopher Meyer told the inquiry that military preparations for the conflict had undermined UN weapons inspectors.
'And suddenly, because of that, the unforgiving nature of the military timetable, we found ourselves scrabbling for the smoking gun, which was another way of saying 'it's not that Saddam has to prove that he's innocent, we've now bloody well got to try and prove that he's guilty',' he said.
'And we - the Americans, the British - have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.'
The inquiry will continue to take evidence in public for a series of high profile figures, including military commanders and ministers, over the coming months culminating in the appearance of former prime minister Tony Blair sometime in the new year.
But, appearing before Sir John Chilcot's inquiry in central London, he admitted there was a 'failure to establish legitimacy' within individual member states.
The US and Britain faced allegations of launching a legal war after they failed to win crucial French and Russian backing for a UN resolution that would have directly authorised military action.
However, Washington and London fell back on the existing resolution 1441, which they just justified an invasion.
While the French and Russians were 'absolutely determined' to establish the need for a precise decision on the use of force in the resolution, the Americans were 'absolutely determined' to resist this, Sir Jeremy said.
'Those two positions were totally irreconcilable. Then you have a situation where diplomacy got clever.'
He explained that resolution 1441 was 'equivocal' on what would happen in the event of non-compliance. It stated the security council would meet, but did not state they would make any decisions about what to do in this event.
'The US and UK took the terms of 1441 absolutely literally, which is the fair and just thing to do with a resolution that takes on the force of a legal declaration,' Sir Jeremy added.
He said the French and others interpreted the resolution as meaning that in the event of non-compliance it would be the security council which would decide what action to take next.
'We never were active enough after the adoption of 1441 to try and clear up that ambiguity because we thought we'd won the point,' Sir Jeremy explained.
He added that at no point had any member of the security council ever presented evidence to him proving that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction.
The allegation that the White House and Downing St always knew Saddam had no nuclear weapon capabilities or programmes formed the central part of Sir Jeremy's memoirs that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office asked be withdrawn in 2005.
Yesterday the inquiry heard from the UK ambassador to Washington at the time of the Iraq war that the coalition search for a 'smoking gun' had failed.
Sir Christopher Meyer told the inquiry that military preparations for the conflict had undermined UN weapons inspectors.
'And suddenly, because of that, the unforgiving nature of the military timetable, we found ourselves scrabbling for the smoking gun, which was another way of saying 'it's not that Saddam has to prove that he's innocent, we've now bloody well got to try and prove that he's guilty',' he said.
'And we - the Americans, the British - have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.'
The inquiry will continue to take evidence in public for a series of high profile figures, including military commanders and ministers, over the coming months culminating in the appearance of former prime minister Tony Blair sometime in the new year.
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